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ABSTRACT

This Note argues that the United States needs to come to a compromise with Mexico
over Mexico’s request for information concerning interest paid by U.S. banks to
residents of Mexico. The United States could ignore Mexico’s request, but that may
create animosity between the two nations. Alternatively, the United States could
fully comply with Mexico’s request; however, that may lead to strong opposition
from the banking sector. It is in the best interest of the United States to model its
compromise on the recent compromise between the United States and Switzerland.
While there are issues with this compromise that would need to be resolved first, a
similar compromise would be a good initial step for two countries that would have a
lot to lose if this interest information request cannot be resolved.
I. INTRODUCTION
All the Mexican Ministry of Finance wants from the United States (U.S.) and the
Internal Revenue Service (IRS) is information related to interest paid by U.S. banks
*
J.D. expected, May 2011, Cleveland State University, Cleveland-Marshall College of
Law; B.S. University of Dayton. The author would like to thank Professor Deborah A. Geier
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to Mexican residents.1 This information would help the Mexican government
identify and prevent tax evasion, money laundering, drug trafficking, and organized
crime.2 This information would also allow the Mexican Ministry of Finance to tax
any funds that were never reported to the Ministry of Finance by its own residents in
the first place as well as the interest earned on these funds from U.S. banks. It is the
same information that the United States wanted and received from Switzerland and
UBS, a global financial services company headquartered in Switzerland, in a recent
August 2009 compromise.3 It is the same information that the United States has
exchanged with Canada on a regular basis since 1997.4 So, why is the United States
not willing to comply with this request?
In addition to having paid a $780 million fine to the United States in February of
20095, UBS agreed in August 2009 to disclose the names and details of
approximately 4,450 accounts held by U.S. citizens in Switzerland to the Swiss
government, which, in turn, agreed to hand the information over to the IRS.6 The IRS
requested this information from UBS so that it could tax the interest accrued by U.S.
taxpayers because it was going untaxed by both Switzerland and the United States.7
Does this fact pattern not sound familiar to Mexico’s request described above? Why,
then, is the United States willing to allow other countries to lose tax dollars when it
is not willing to do the same?
Despite these recent events, the United States has yet to respond to a request
made by Mexico Secretary of Finance Agustin Carstens, dating back to February of
2009.8 Carstens made this request to the IRS because of Mexico’s recent victories
against the country’s drug cartels and organized crime.9 Mexico has determined that
it wants to take advantage of its crackdown on crime and start benefitting from it
1

See Mexican Finance Minister Seeks Exchange of Certain Bank Information with United
States, 2009 TAX NOTES TODAY 50-12 (Mar. 18, 2009) [hereinafter Mexican Finance
Minister].
2

Id.

3
See Agreement between the United States of America and the Swiss Confederation on
the Request for Information from the Internal Revenue Service of the United States of
America Regarding UBS AG, a Corporation Established under the Laws of the Swiss
Confederation , U.S.-Switz., Aug. 19, 2009, available at http://www.irs.ustreas.gov/pub/irsdrop/us-swiss_government_agreement.pdf [hereinafter UBS Agreement].
4

See Final Regs Require Reporting of Bank Deposit Interest Paid to NRAs Who Are
Residents of Canada, 1996 TAX NOTES TODAY 84-13 (Apr. 22, 1996) [hereinafter Final
Regs].
5

Kevin McCoy, UBS Must Release Data on 4,500 Suspected Tax Cheats, USA TODAY,
Aug. 20, 2009, at 1B, available at http://www.usatoday.com/money/perfi/taxes/2009-08-19ubs-tax-irs_N.htm.
6
Evan Perez & Carrick Mollenkamp, Swiss Bank to Give Up Depositors' Names to
Prosecutors, WALL ST. J., Feb. 19, 2009, at A1.
7

See McCoy, supra note 5.

8

Robert Goulder, How the U.S. is a Tax Haven for Mexico’s Wealthy, 2009 TAX NOTES
TODAY 161-3 (Aug. 24, 2009).
9

See id.
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financially, as well.10 The start of this process began with Mexico’s initial crackdown
on crime. With that element already set in place, the Mexican government now
hopes to find suspicious bank accounts in foreign countries, such as the United
States.11 With this bank account information in hand, Mexico’s Ministry of Finance
could then determine whether the money in these bank accounts came from
legitimate sources of reported income or from illegal sources of unreported income,
such as drug trafficking and organized crime.12 Mexico believes that a majority of
these Mexican accounts in foreign banks come from illegal sources and are
unreported to the Ministry of Finance.13 Requesting this interest information from
U.S. banks is the next step in one large plan already set in motion by the Mexican
government to bring in much needed tax revenue and to crack down on crime.
Even Switzerland, a country known worldwide for its bank secrecy laws
regarding the exchange of similar information, was willing to compromise with the
United States and come to an amicable resolution.14 However, those within the Swiss
government believe that “the agreement fully complies with Swiss law and doesn’t
violate banking secrecy, which . . . isn’t meant to protect criminal behavior.”15 While
the Swiss government originally believed that there would be no long-term effects on
their banking secrecy laws as a whole, it appears that may not be the case.16 To avoid
further problems with other countries, the Swiss government signed new tax
agreements with at least twelve nations, ending a decades-old practice by agreeing to
exchange confidential information regarding some of its bank clients.17 It remains to
be seen whether this is the beginning of the end for Swiss bank secrecy laws.
In light of this recent compromise between the United States, Switzerland, and
UBS, it is in the United States' best interest to comply with Mexico's request, as well.
However, full compliance is not as simple as it may appear. No matter what the
United States ultimately decides on this issue, some group or faction will be
disappointed with the end result. Full compliance would harm an already-hurting
U.S. banking sector. Non-compliance would aggravate an important neighboring

10

See id.

11

See Ken Stier, Foreign Tax Cheats Find U.S. Banks a Safe Haven, TIME, Oct. 29, 2009,
available at http://www.time.com/time/business/article/0,8599,1933288,00.html.
12
“Carstens doesn't say it in his letter, but that information exchange would also allow
Mexican tax authorities to identify doctors, dentists, and business executives who knowingly
shelter money tax free in U.S. banks.” See Goulder, supra note 8.
13

See Mexican Finance Minister, supra note 1.

14

See Ashby Jones, In UBS Deal, Is the U.S. Hoping To Use Secrecy to Its Advantage?,
WALL ST. J., Aug. 19, 2009, available at http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2009/08/19/in-ubs-deal-isthe-us-hoping-to-use-secrecy-to-its-advantage.
15

Id.

16
Manuel Ammann told the AFP that "[t]he time when tax evaders could take advantage
of Swiss financial services and feel safe about it is certainly over." See Peter Capella, Swiss
Bank Secrecy Emerges from 2009 with Holes, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Dec. 26, 2009,
available at http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5gKT_Cz-IckohtkgiiSV
2qTGghMCg.
17

Id.
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country in Mexico. That is something that the United States does not want to do.
Given these potential reactions, the U.S. government must now perform a difficult
balancing act between what is best for the United States and what is best for Mexico,
one of its biggest allies, and the world as a whole.
Part II of this Note discusses the history and background of the last two years of
the UBS and Switzerland situation in depth. Part II also explores Mexico’s current
request to the United States. What exactly does Mexico want from the United States
and why? Part III further analyzes Mexico’s request and the issues that the United
States will face. What issues will arise due to the recent UBS Agreement that has
eerily similar facts to the Mexico situation?
Part IV explores the costs and benefits of possible solutions to the United States’
dilemma. Should the United States fully comply with Mexico, or should it sit back
and do nothing? Should the United States use the UBS Agreement as a model for
future negotiations with Mexico? Why or why not? Part V concludes this Note and
discusses the most appropriate solution in these circumstances. While there appears
to be no perfect solution to this dilemma, there is a right way to deal with Mexico’s
request in order to satisfy both countries. Both countries need to receive a significant
benefit from any potential resolution to be reached.
II. THE PAST AND PRESENT OF THE UNITED STATES: A FURTHER LOOK INTO
SWITZERLAND AND MEXICO
A. The Involvement of UBS with U.S. Taxpayers
In the spring of 2007, Bradley Birkenfeld, a U.S. citizen who worked for UBS in
Switzerland from 2001 to 2006,18 came forward to the U.S. Justice Department with
information implicating UBS in helping American clients defraud the U.S.
Treasury.19 In divulging this information to the United States, Birkenfeld admitted
that UBS private bankers, including himself, were helping American clients invest,
spend, and move their money without submitting the required disclosures to the
United States.20 One example of moving a client’s money involved Birkenfeld
removing funds from a client’s account, buying diamonds with these funds, and then
transporting the diamonds into the United States.21 Even though the diamonds were
transported in a toothpaste tube, Birkenfeld claims that since the diamonds were
worth less than $10,000 they did not need to be declared at customs.22
Transactions like this one are done because UBS’s American clients want to
evade U.S. taxes on their investment returns. American clients are able to evade
taxes through UBS because of Swiss bank secrecy laws.23 Under Swiss law, only the
18

Janet Novack, Banker Charged with Helping Billionaire Dodge Taxes, FORBES, May 13,
2008, available at http://www.forbes.com/2008/05/13/taxes-ubs-olenicoff-biz-beltwaycz_jn_0513taxes.html.
19

Banking: A Crack in the Swiss Vault, CBS NEWS, Jan. 3, 2010, available at
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2009/12/30/60minutes/main6038169.shtml.
20

Id.

21

Id.

22

Id.

23

See id
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individual client and the client’s bank have the right to the bank account information
of an individual.24 Swiss banks were sworn to this secrecy in 1934 due to then-Nazi
Germany pursuing this information from Germans who were believed to be Jews or
political opponents.25 While similar circumstances are not occurring today, Swiss
bank secrecy law still exists more than 75 years later.
Eventually, on May 13, 2008, the United States charged Bradley Birkenfeld with
defrauding the United States by helping other U.S. citizens evade paying taxes on
their investment returns in bank accounts held in Switzerland.26 Birkenfeld
ultimately pleaded guilty and agreed to cooperate with the United States.27 In
agreeing to help, Birkenfeld admitted that UBS banks in Switzerland held
approximately $20 billion in the undeclared accounts of approximately 20,000 U.S.
citizens.28 Because these large sums of money were going untaxed by the IRS, the
United States then served “John Doe” summons on UBS on July 1, 2008.29 A “John
Doe” summons is “a summons made out to an unidentified defendant who is referred
to in the summons as John Doe.”30 This was done because the United States did not
know the identities of those residents who had undeclared deposits held in these UBS
bank accounts.31 Switzerland has “long been known as a place to put your money if
you don't like taxes or you commit crimes for a living.”32
However, the issuance of the “John Doe” summons did not resolve much due to
the structure of the tax treaties the United States has with other countries, including
Switzerland.33 Every U.S. tax treaty contains an article that pertains to the exchange
24
See C. Todd Jones, Compulsion Over Comity: The United States' Assault on Foreign
Bank Secrecy, 12 NW. J. INT'L L. & BUS. 454, 462 (1992).
25
Peter Capella, History Comes Full Circle as Swiss Bank Secrecy Shudders, AGENCE
FRANCE PRESSE, Feb. 7, 2010, available at http://business.inquirer.net/money/breakingnews/
view/20100207-251776/History-comes-full-circle-as-Swiss-bank-secrecy-shudders.
26
Birkenfeld was not the only person charged by the United States in connection with the
UBS scandal. Igor Olenicoff, a U.S. real estate investor whom Birkenfeld helped hide $200
million in offshore assets, pleaded guilty to federal tax charges in 2007 and agreed to pay the
IRS more than $52 million in overdue taxes, penalties, and interest. Others, involved as
current and former employees of UBS, have been charged, but are believed to be in
Switzerland at this time. Novack, supra note 18; see also McCoy, supra note 5.
27
Janet Novack, UBS Cheats Can Still Come Clean, FORBES, July 9, 2008, available at
http://www.forbes.com/2008/07/08/irs-ubs-taxes-biz-beltway-cz_jn_0709beltway.html.
28

Id.

29

Id.

30

Dictionary.com, http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/John+Doe+summons (last
visited Apr. 4, 2011).
31

See Carrick Mollenkamp, IRS to Expand Use of 'John Doe' Tactic, WALL ST. J., Apr. 29,
2009, at M12.
32

Kate Pickert, A Brief History of: Swiss Banks, TIME, Feb. 26, 2009, available at
http://www.time.com/ time/magazine/article/0,9171,1881977,00.html.
33
The United States has executed bilateral tax treaties with dozens of countries around the
world. The chief aim of these treaties is to “reduce juridical double taxation, to prevent
excessive taxation, and, increasingly, to help to police tax avoidance through exchange of
information . . . . They resolve disparities in assertions of jurisdiction to tax by providing tie-
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of information between the two contracting countries.34 Article 26 of the United
States-Switzerland Tax Treaty states that, “in cases of tax fraud, if specifically
requested by the competent authority of a Contracting State, the competent authority
of the other Contracting State shall provide information under this Article in the form
of authenticated copies of unedited original records or documents.”35 The United
States-Switzerland Tax Treaty defines “tax fraud” as “fraudulent conduct that causes
or is intended to cause an illegal and substantial reduction in the amount of the tax
paid to a Contracting State.”36 These provisions of the United States-Switzerland Tax
Treaty are interpreted to mean that original documents and records will only be
handed over to the United States if the IRS already knows who it is specifically
looking for by name.37 The problem with that interpretation is that knowing a
particular person’s name is not typical.
At this point, Switzerland was hoping the United States would dismiss the “John
Doe” summons against UBS in exchange for an amendment to the countries’ tax
treaty.38 However, the United States was able to secure another victory in February
of 2009 when UBS agreed to a $780 million deferred prosecution agreement for
offering their services to wealthy Americans to evade paying taxes.39 In accordance
with the agreement, UBS also agreed to disclose account information on request
from its American clients, as well as to stop providing services in the future that help
American clients evade taxes.40 This was a tough blow for UBS, as this practice
accounted for between $120 and $140 million in revenues each year.41

breaker rules in situations in which a taxpayer would be a resident of both contracting states
under each state's domestic law. Once residence is resolved, treaties set up a system of default
allocation rules, under which either the residence state or the source state is assigned an
exclusive or primary right to tax income based on its classification, and the other state either
cedes its right to tax entirely or retains a residual right to tax.” Ruth Mason, U.S. Tax Treaty
Policy and the European Court of Justice, 59 TAX L. REV. 65, 69-71 (2005).
34

See Goulder, supra note 8.

35

Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation with Respect to Taxes on Income,
U.S.-Switz., Oct. 2, 1996, available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-trty/swiss.pdf.
36

Id.

37

See Goulder, supra note 8.

38

See Perez & Mollenkamp, supra note 6.

39

Lynnley Browning, UBS to Pay $780 Million Fine over Offshore Services, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 19, 2009, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/18/business/worldbusiness/
18iht-UBS.20289166.html.
40

Press Release, Department of Justice, UBS Enters into Deferred Prosecution Agreement
(Feb. 18, 2009), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2009/February/09-tax-136.html.
41

“From at least 1999 through 2008, UBS acted as an unregistered broker-dealer and
investment advisor to thousands of U.S. persons and offshore entities with United States
citizens as beneficial owners. UBS had at least 11,000 to 14,000 of such clients and held
billions of dollars of assets for them.” John Churchill, UBS Nailed with $780 Million Fine,
Admits to Aiding Tax Dodge Clients, REGISTERED REP, Feb. 18, 2009, available at
http://registeredrep.com/advisorland/regulatory/ubs_nailed_admits_to_tax_dodge0218/.
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This conflict finally came to a resolution on August 19, 2009, when the United
States and Switzerland came to terms on the UBS Agreement.42 In return for the
United States withdrawing its “John Doe” summons against UBS, Switzerland
agreed to process the United States’ request for the outstanding account information
that it had requested all along.43 Both countries agreed that this request would
involve approximately 4,450 accounts held by American clients of UBS in
Switzerland.44 Within 60 days of UBS receiving a request from the Swiss Federal
Tax Administration (SFTA), UBS would submit the necessary information to the
SFTA on the first 500 cases.45 The remaining cases would be submitted by UBS to
the SFTA within 270 days of the initial request by the United States.46
B. The Beginning of Mexico’s Involvement
The United States’ struggle with UBS and Switzerland had finally come to an
end. The United States got what it wanted: A large fine paid by UBS, an amendment
to their tax agreement with Switzerland, and, in time, the information that it
requested in the first place. All appeared to be good on this front. At least that is
what the United States thought. On February 9, 2009, while the United States was
still in the middle of its struggle with Switzerland, Mexico Secretary of Finance
Agustin Carstens requested that the United States and Mexico start sharing
information related to interest paid by banks of one country to residents of the
other.47 This request is essentially the same request that the United States made to
Switzerland and struggled with for more than two years. With history now on his
side, Carstens made this request to the IRS because of its recent victories against
Mexico’s drug cartels and organized crime.48 Mexico had determined it wanted to
take advantage of their crackdown on crime and start benefitting from it financially.
Mexico Secretary of Finance Agustin Carstens believes this interest information is
necessary from the United States in order to enforce Mexico’s tax regime more
effectively and receive additional revenues from it.49
Mexico’s request involves a reciprocal agreement between the two countries.
Mexico wants information related to interest paid by U.S. banks to residents of
Mexico, and is willing to do the same for the United States.50 This should not be a
problem for the two countries, according to Carstens, because “Mexico and the
United States [already] regularly exchange information, on a case-by-case basis, in
accordance to our bilateral Tax Treaty. We also exchange bulk information on

42

UBS Agreement, supra note 3, at 6.

43

Id. at 3.

44

Id. at 2.

45

Id. at 4.

46

Id.

47

See Mexican Finance Minister, supra note 1.

48

See id.

49

See id.

50

Id.
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interest payments (between corporations), dividends and royalties.”51 Carstens
compared a potential agreement with Mexico and the United States to the current
situations between Canada and both the United States and Mexico because Canada
already has mechanisms in place that exchange this interest information on a regular
basis with both countries.52
The difference in treatment of the exchange of interest information by the United
States is not found in the language of the U.S. tax treaties with Mexico and Canada.
Rather, the distinction stems from Section 6049 of the Internal Revenue Code and
the relevant regulations associated with that section.53 Section 6049 states that “every
person who makes payments of interest . . . aggregating $10 or more to any other
person during any calendar year . . . shall make a return . . . setting forth the
aggregate amount of such payments and the name and address of the person to whom
paid.”54 Treasury Regulation § 1.6049-8 clarifies the meaning of Section 6049 by
stating “the term interest means interest paid to a Canadian nonresident alien
individual . . . where the interest is…maintained at an office within the United States
. . . . A Canadian nonresident alien individual is an individual who resides in Canada
and is not a United States citizen.”55 There is no mention of Mexico in this or any
other regulation on this matter.56
C. Where the UBS Agreement went Wrong
On top of Mexico’s request, the UBS Agreement took a turn for the worse. On
January 21, 2010, an American UBS client had her appeal granted by Switzerland’s
Federal Administrative Court.57 Her original case sought to prevent the Swiss
government from disclosing her account information to the United States under the
UBS Agreement.58 Switzerland’s Federal Administrative Court held that “the
settlement [from August 2009 between Switzerland and the United States] ignored
aspects of Swiss banking secrecy rules, including safeguards that prevent the
government from handing over files to foreign tax authorities except in cases of
deliberate fraud.”59 The court classified the UBS Agreement as “merely a mutual
51

Id.

52

Mexican Finance Minister, supra note 1.

53

26 U.S.C. § 6049 (2008).

54

Id. at (a)(2).

55

Treas. Reg. § 1.6049-8(a) (2000).

56

Id.

57

Kristen A. Parillo, Swiss Court Says Government Cannot Disclose UBS Data on U.S.
Client, 2010 TAX NOTES TODAY 15-1 (Jan. 25, 2010) (Switzerland’s Federal Administrative
Court is similar to the United States Court of Appeals.).
58

“The ruling, made public on January 22, reviewed one unnamed client's appeal as a pilot
case. Twenty-five similar cases are pending. The court reportedly ruled that the Swiss
government may not disclose the client's account information because her failure to file a
Form W-9 did not constitute ‘tax fraud and the like,’ as required by the information exchange
provisions of the Switzerland-U.S. income tax treaty.” Id.
59

Matthew Saltmarsh, Swiss to Submit Revised UBS Tax Deal to Parliament, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 24, 2010, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/25/business/global/25tax.html.
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agreement that permitted no change to the terms that had been given binding
definitions in the bilateral double taxation agreement.”60
The granting of this appeal came as a temporary blow to the United States
because Switzerland could not transfer any additional information to the United
States until the UBS Agreement had been approved by Parliament, unless authorized
to do so by the consent of the UBS clients themselves.61 Out of the approximately
4,450 accounts believed to fall under the UBS Agreement, only 250 of them
involved fraud, while the remaining 4,200 involved cases of "continued or serious
tax offense," which, under Swiss law, does not rise to the level of “fraud.”62 This is
significant because the UBS Agreement defines the term "continued or serious tax
offense" to include
[t]he failure of a U.S.-domiciled client to provide a Form W-9 for a threeyear period, with at least one year occurring in the requested period, or the
inability of a U.S. client to prove on request by the Swiss Federal Tax
Administration that he has complied with U.S. reporting requirements,
such as the filing of a foreign bank account report.63
Switzerland’s Federal Administrative Court ultimately ruled in the January, 2010,
case that the Swiss government cannot disclose a client's account information
because the failure to file a Form W-9 did not constitute "tax fraud and the like" as
required by the Switzerland-United States Income Tax Treaty.64 This precedent will
make it difficult for the United States to obtain any information concerning
approximately 4,200 out of the 4,450 accounts believed to fall within the UBS
Agreement because it “basically invalidates” the compromise.65
A recent development, however, has put the United States back in line to receive
the bank account information that it has been seeking all along. On March 31, 2010,
Switzerland’s Federal Council approved an amendment to the UBS Agreement that
“creates the necessary legal basis for the Swiss Federal Tax Administration (SFTA)
to issue final decisions even in cases of continued and serious tax evasion, and
permits Switzerland to fulfill the obligations under international law that it entered
into with the original Agreement.”66 The amendment to the UBS Agreement raises it
60
Swiss to Resume Talks with U.S. over UBS Accounts, WEBCPA, Jan. 29, 2010, available
at http://www.onwallstreet.com/news/UBS-Swiss-Accounts-2665632-1.html.
61

“[Swiss] Federal Council [could] put the UBS agreement to Parliament for approval, an
approach that the [Federal Administrative Court] indicated in its ruling as a possible solution.
If the agreement were approved by the Swiss Parliament, the Federal Administrative Court
could not then regard the agreement as merely a mutual agreement in any future appeals.
Instead, the agreement would stand as a treaty with the same status as the older and more
general bilateral double taxation agreement and, according to general rules of interpretation,
would take precedence over the latter.” Id.
62

Parillo, supra note 57.

63

Id.

64

Id.

65

See id.

66

Switzerland Announces Signing of Protocol to UBS Agreement with U.S., 2010 TAX
NOTES TODAY 62-29 (Apr. 1, 2010).
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to the same level as the bilateral double taxation convention.67 This amendment will
allow Switzerland to fulfill its obligation to the United States in turning over the
necessary bank account information that had been disallowed by Switzerland’s
Federal Administrative Court.68
Now it is the United States’ turn to make a move. Does it fully comply with
Mexico’s request? Or does it continue to do nothing, as it has for the last year?
There are several issues that the United States will face in implementing a solution
that will be further examined in Parts III and IV of this Note.
III. MEXICO’S REQUEST AND THE ISSUES THAT WILL ARISE
A. How Mexico got to this Point
The history behind Mexico’s request dates back to the year 2006. Felipe
Calderon was narrowly elected as President of Mexico.69 President Calderon’s first
major project was battling Mexico’s illegal drug trade.70 Battling Mexico’s illegal
drug trade was significant because it has been attempted many times in the past to no
avail.71 President Calderon’s concentrated effort on illegal drug trafficking has led to
much success thus far, but much success has come with much violence and death.72
Mexico’s drug cartels have as much power, money, and influence as any
organization in the country. Because of this immense power, President Calderon has
been forced to take extreme measures to keep everything under control. These
efforts have included deploying the country’s military in situations where it is
believed that local drug cartels are having too much influence on the police in the
area.73 President Calderon has also partnered with countries globally, most
importantly the United States, in order to obtain as much support as possible.74 The
United States is a logical ally in this fight against drugs because most of the drugs
these cartels are selling and producing ultimately end up in the United States.75
President Calderon’s partnership with the United States began in March of 2007
when President Calderon and former United States President George W. Bush began
discussions that focused on U.S. financial support in Mexico’s campaign against
drugs.76 In the end, the United States transferred $400 million to Mexico in 2008 in
what became known as the Merida Initiative.77 These funds were intended for uses
67

Id.

68

Id.

69

Goulder, supra note 8.

70

See id.

71

See id.

72

See id.

73

Id.

74

Goulder, supra note 8.

75

See id.

76

Stephanie Erin Brewer, Rethinking the Merida Initiative: Why the U.S. Must Change
Course in its Approach to Mexico's Drug War, 16 HUM. RTS. BR. 9 (Spring 2009).
77

Id.
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such as “the purchase of airplanes and helicopters for the Mexican military for
surveillance, counternarcotics, and counterterrorism operations; the purchase of
scanners and armored vehicles; the establishment of law enforcement databases;
training for specialized police units combating organized crime; and anti-corruption
activities in the federal police.”78 In 2009, Congress approved an additional $300
million to be sent to Mexico in furtherance of the Merida Initiative.79 In total, as
much as $1.4 billion will be sent to Mexico over a three-year period ending in
2010.80
Given the amount of money invested in Mexico’s fight against their drug cartels,
it is in the best interest of the United States to continue these efforts and comply with
Mexico’s bank interest information request. If Mexico wants this information in
order to tax these drug cartels, among others, shouldn’t the United States simply
comply to further their joint efforts against drugs and crime? In theory, the United
States would love to cooperate. However, that may not be a feasible solution given
the circumstances.
B. The U.S. Banking Sector’s Opposition
Complying with Mexico’s request is not as easy as it may appear. The main
obstacle that the United States would face in exchanging information related to
interest earned by Mexican residents from U.S. banks is the strong opposition posed
by the U.S. banking sector, which has opposed similar requests in the past. In
January of 2001, the IRS issued a proposed regulation under Section 6049 entitled
“Guidance on Reporting of Deposit Interest Paid to Nonresident Aliens.”81 The
purpose of the proposed regulation was to extend the information reporting
requirement of Treasury Regulation § 1.6049-8 to “bank deposit interest paid to
nonresident alien individuals who are residents of other foreign countries.”82 One of
the reasons given by the IRS for attempting to make final such a regulation is that
other foreign countries with which the United States has tax treaties with have
requested this information in the past.83
Even with the Treasury Department’s arguably good intent to follow through
with other foreign countries’ requests, the regulation never became effective. During
the Treasury Department’s request for public comments, banks and organizations
across the country wrote the Treasury Department displaying their strong opposition
to the proposed regulation.84 Eventually, the Treasury Department countered with a
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second proposed regulation, Regulation 133254-02, which narrowed the scope of the
reporting requirements.85 Instead of banks reporting to the IRS information on
interest paid to all nonresident aliens on an annual basis, the second proposed
regulation would have narrowed the requirements to only apply to interest paid to
residents of 16 specific foreign countries.86 The list of countries whose residents
would be subject to the second proposal did not include Mexico or any South
American, Central American, and Caribbean countries.87
Despite the narrow scope of the Treasury Department’s second proposed
regulation, strong opposition from the banking sector continued to exist and the
proposed regulation never became final.88 The banking sector still believed that the
proposed regulation would result in nonresident aliens moving their funds elsewhere,
even if they were not residents of any of the countries affected by the second
proposed regulation. Why would a wealthy investor keep his money in a country
that is in the process of making it more difficult for foreign investors to avoid paying
taxes to their home countries? For most taxpayers that goal, unfortunately, may be
the point of placing money in another country’s bank in the first place.
The banking sector has resisted this change in policy in the past and would do so
again in the future because of the likelihood that foreign investors would move their
business elsewhere. When similar regulations were proposed by the Treasury
Department at the beginning of the decade, the Florida International Banking
Association estimated that the regulation change could cause one-third to more than
one-half of the roughly $50 billion of foreign deposits held in its banks to move
elsewhere.89 The Association further estimated that between 41,000 and 78,000 jobs
would be lost within fifteen years in the state of Florida alone if the regulation were
adopted, while revenues would drop between $4.4 billion and $8.36 billion each
year.90 Those numbers are staggering given the context of the regulation’s effect on
Florida alone.
C. Other Issues that may Arise
Mexico Secretary of Finance Agustin Carstens is well aware of the United States
automatic exchange of interest information arrangement that has been in place with
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Canada since 1997.91 This arrangement requires the reporting of interest paid on
deposits maintained at a bank's office in the United States to an individual who is a
nonresident alien of the United States and a resident of Canada.92 This is exactly
what Mexico is requesting from the United States. If the United States has the same
automatic exchange of information agreement with Canada, a bordering country to
the north, then why does the United States not have that same agreement with
Mexico, a bordering country to the south?
Once again, while it may appear that the logical thing for the United States to do
would be to fully comply with Mexico’s request, there are issues with that argument,
as well. The United States has little to gain from exchanging this information on a
regular basis.93 While Mexico is willing to offer reciprocity to the United States, this
offer has minimal appeal. U.S. taxpayers are not depositing their money in Mexican
banks.94 These U.S. taxpayers can find safer and more secure banks than Mexican
banks that have stricter bank secrecy laws because those looking to evade taxes on
these funds want their money to stay safe and away from taxes. History, until
recently, has shown that Switzerland is an example of such a safe location. While
Switzerland was willing to give in to the United State’s request for bank account
information, it does not appear that the United States is ready to do the same for
Mexico.
The United States also has to worry about other countries making the same
request that Mexico has made from it. While most regard Canada to be the exception
to the rule due to the two countries’ close relationship, if the United States complies
with Mexico as well, countries across the world will begin to inquire too.95
Compliance would cause severe consequences for the U.S. banking sector, as
explained above.96 So what will the United States do? While that remains to be seen,
there are several possible routes the United States can go. Even though all of these
possible solutions have significant consequences, the United States must a find a
solution that is beneficial to sectors in both countries.
IV. COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS OF POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS
A. Issues with Full Compliance and Non-Compliance
The United States has the option of fully complying with Mexico’s request. This
would result in banks and financial institutions across the country annually reporting
interest paid to nonresident aliens of the United States and residents of Mexico to the
IRS, which would forward that information to Mexico. Banks and financial
institutions already know which accounts this reporting mechanism would affect.
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Banks would determine whether a client is a Mexican resident based on the address
in the country of permanent residence required to be provided on the Form W-8.97 Is
this effort worth it to the United States and the IRS, or is the benefit one-sided?
As discussed earlier in this Note, the main issue that the United States would face
in complying with Mexico’s request is the strong opposition from the banking sector
and the effects on this already struggling industry. There are also additional issues
that would need to be overcome before full compliance becomes a viable option.
Full compliance would create negative precedent in matters concerning interest
earned by nonresident aliens. If the United States complied with Mexico’s request,
would it not have to do the same for all other ally countries? A good example of
negative precedent is that, since September 2009, Canada has been requesting from
UBS the same information the United States received from the financial institution in
the UBS Agreement.98 While nothing has come from it yet, Canada is threatening a
lawsuit against UBS, much like the United States lawsuit, if UBS is not willing to
comply.99 In addition, while the United States was willing to compromise with
Canada, full compliance with Mexico would show that Canada was not just the
exception to the rule. Full compliance with Mexico would also not be a sufficient
long-term solution to the big-picture problem. This problem will be discussed in
more detail later in this Note.
In contrast, noncompliance would be the simplest solution for the United States.
Noncompliance results in expending the least amount of resources possible. The
banking sector would not lose out on any revenue from services provided to
nonresident aliens. Everything would stay as-is. There is a strong possibility,
however, that Mexico would not react well to noncompliance.
The main issue with failing to comply with Mexico’s request is a breakdown of
the two countries’ relationship in other areas. The United States and Mexico have a
strong trading relationship. An important element of this trading relationship is the
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). NAFTA created the world's
largest free trade bloc, “which now links 444 million people producing $17 trillion
worth of goods and services.”100 In terms of total trade, Mexico is the United States’
third largest trading partner, while the United States ranks first among Mexico’s
trading partners.101 In terms of U.S. imports, Mexico ranks third among United States
trading partners, after China and Canada.102 In 2008, the United States imported
$399.5 billion worth of goods from Canada and $215.9 billion from Mexico.103
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Imported goods from Canada and Mexico totaled $555.4 billion in 2008, which was
up 5.2% from 2007, and up 268% since the year before the enactment of NAFTA in
1993.104 In terms of U.S. exports, Mexico ranks second, after Canada.105 In 2008,
total U.S. exports purchased by Mexico were $151.2 billion, while Canada purchased
$261.2 billion of U.S. exports.106 These numbers are up 7.2% since the year before,
2007, and 190% since 1993.107 U.S. exports to Canada and Mexico accounted for
32% of overall U.S. exports in 2008.108 U.S. foreign direct investment in Canada and
Mexico was $348.7 billion in 2007, up 11.3% from 2006.109 Foreign direct
investment is “any form of investment that earns interest in enterprises which
function outside of the domestic territory of the investor.”110 U.S. direct investment
in Canada and Mexico is typically in the manufacturing, finance, nonbank holding
companies, and mining sectors.111 Canadian and Mexican foreign direct investment
in the United States was $219.2 billion in 2007, up 21.4% from 2006. 112 Canadian
and Mexican direct investment in the U.S. is typically in the finance, manufacturing,
and banking sectors.113 Given these figures, the United States and Mexico need each
other in terms of importing and exporting goods.
The United States and Mexico have had problems in the past over NAFTA. For
example, under NAFTA, Mexican commercial trucks were supposed to be given full
access to four border states by 1995 and full access throughout the United States by
2000 in order to bring imported goods into the country.114 The United States cited
safety concerns as its reasoning for not allowing full implementation.115 While a pilot
program was put in place in September of 2007 to eventually initiate a full access
truck program, Congress enacted the Omnibus Appropriations Act in 2009, which
terminated the pilot program that allowed Mexican-registered trucks to operate
beyond the 25-mile border commercial zone inside the United States.116 In response,
Mexico increased the duties on ninety U.S. products, which increased the duties on

104

Id.

105

See id.; see also Villarreal, supra note 101, at summary.

106

See Office of the United States Trade Representative, supra note 100.

107

Id.

108

Id.

109

Id.

110

Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), ECONOMYWATCH, http://www.economywatch.com/
foreign-direct-investment/ (last visited May 8, 2010).
111

See Office of the United States Trade Representative, supra note 100.

112

Id.

113

Id.

114

See Villarreal, supra note 101.

115

Id.

116

See id. at 25.

218

GLOBAL BUSINESS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 1:203

these imports by $2.4 billion, effective March 19, 2009.117 As of early 2009, both
countries were still attempting to resolve this issue.118
Another disagreement within NAFTA has been a trade dispute over sugar and
high fructose corn syrup. Mexico believed that it could send its excess sugar to the
United States duty-free, while the United States argued that there was a limitation to
the amount of sugar that could be imported on a duty-free basis.119 In response to the
United States not allowing Mexico’s excess sugar into the country duty-free, the
Mexican government imposed a twenty percent tax on soft drinks made within the
United States with high fructose corn syrup.120 This tax was implemented to help
Mexico’s domestic sugar industry deal with its problem of producing too much
sugar.121 Eventually, both countries came to a resolution that set a limit on the
amount of sugar shipped to the other country.122 Mexico also repealed the twenty
percent tax effective January 1, 2007, more than five years after the tax was initially
enacted.123
There are also growing concerns about the amount of corn and beans entering
Mexico from the United States.124 Mexican President Felipe Calderon is facing
pressure within Mexico to reinstall tariffs put on corn and beans that Mexico
collected from the United States before the enactment of NAFTA. 125 While NAFTA
has been in effect since 1993, the United States was facing tariffs on corn and beans
from Mexico until January 1, 2008.126 Since then, the opposition claims that the corn
and beans entering Mexico from the United States are hurting the local farmers in
Mexico.127 In defense of NAFTA, U.S. Commerce Secretary Carlos Gutierrez is
reassuring Mexican farmers that “the corn being imported to Mexico is not the white
corn that the Mexicans grow to produce their tortillas, but rather the yellow corn that
is used to feed livestock.”128 According to government estimates, there are about 3.5
million corn farmers in Mexico that need this yellow corn because they use donkeys
or mules rather than machines.129
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Besides potential issues over NAFTA, the United States and Mexico could
encounter issues over Mexico’s fight with its country’s drug lords. One of Mexican
President Felipe Calderon’s anti-drug strategies has been to send 45,000 troops to
various locations throughout Mexico, including 7,000 to Juarez, a city well-known as
the world’s murder capital.130 These efforts have not come without great heartache,
as there have been over 18,000 drug-related murders, including 5,349 in Juarez itself,
since President Calderon took power in December of 2006.131 The reason for the
large concentration of murders in Juarez is that there is currently a war going on
between two of Mexico’s drug gangs over control of the smuggling rights to the
large U.S. market.132 These murders have included numerous Americans.133 Because
of the quantity of illegal drugs entering the United States from Mexico and the
numerous murders of American citizens occurring throughout Mexico, the United
States has a large stake in Mexico’s fight against its drug cartels. Besides pledging
over $400 million a year to Mexico’s anti-drug efforts, the U.S. government has
offered assistance in helping Mexico investigate the recent killings of Americans.134
There is much at stake for Mexico, as well as the United States, in controlling
Mexico’s drug lords and cartels.
The United States and Mexico could potentially encounter significant issues in
the area of immigration, as well. In the early 1990s, the United States was allowing
over a half-million legal admissions to the United States from Mexico each year,
reaching its peak in 1991 of almost one million people.135 However, since 1993, the
number of legal admissions to the United States from Mexico has not exceeded
200,000 people.136 Even at approximately 175,000 legal admissions from Mexico in
2004, that number is approximately 18.5% of all new U.S. legal permanent
residents.137 Canada accounts for only approximately 1.6% of the total legal
admissions for any given year.138 In comparison, the United States gives temporary
visas to less than five thousand Mexican residents annually, while giving temporary
visas to over sixty thousand Canadian residents per year.139
Given these figures, there has been tension between the two countries concerning
this issue. With unemployment continuing to rise, politicians are concerned with the
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fact that there are over twelve million illegal immigrants currently residing in the
United States.140 While some lawmakers are willing to allow those already in the
country to be granted citizenship if in good standing, others are willing to fight this
battle because they believe that Americans should be given the first opportunity to
jobs within the United States.141 This animosity over immigration reform, coupled
with the potential animosity if the United States continues to ignore Mexico’s
request for bank account information, could result in significant deterioration of
relations between the two countries. While a deterioration of relations is just mere
speculation at this point, matters have certainly worsened between the United States
and Mexico given the current tough economies for both countries.
In addition to the relationship between the two countries, the United States also
has to be concerned with its “tax haven” status with the rest of the world. At the
center of the international tax world is hope that all countries will join together and
defeat tax evasion and fraud completely. This effort has been headed by the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). The OECD
defines a tax haven as “a jurisdiction characterized by lack of transparency and lack
of effective exchange of information . . . . The key factor . . . is not so much that a
country is a low-tax jurisdiction, but that there is excessive secrecy.”142 Jeffrey
Owens, director of the center for tax policy and administration at the OECD, says,
“the OECD's objectives regarding tax havens include improved transparency,
improved exchange of information, and a cooperative approach between tax
authorities. What the OECD does not seek to do is harmonize tax rates or impinge on
national fiscal sovereignty.”143 Based on the OECD’s definition of a tax haven and
the organization’s main objectives regarding tax havens, the United States would
directly conflict with those objectives and strengthen its status as a tax haven if it did
not comply. In fact, a recent study done by the Tax Justice Network (TJN) has
already stated that the United States is a tax haven. On November 1, 2009, the TJN
released its rankings of global tax havens.144 The rankings listed the United States as
the number one tax haven in the world, with Switzerland only third in the
rankings.145 Among the twelve factors considered in these rankings that are relevant
for this discussion are formal banking secrecy, automatic information exchange,
bilateral treaties, and effective access to banking information, among others.146
With this recent information coming to light, the United States might be inclined
to remove itself from the top of the TJN’s rankings. Given the efforts that the United
140
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States has already put forth in complying with OECD standards, such as
implementing the OECD’s internationally agreed tax standard, ignoring Mexico’s
request for an exchange of interest information would make these efforts less
meaningful.147 Among these efforts was President Obama’s proposal to "crack down
on illegal overseas tax evasion, close loopholes, and make it more profitable for
companies to create jobs here in the United States."148 Within his proposal, President
Obama plans on getting tough with overseas tax havens.149 This includes
“eliminating loopholes for ‘disappearing’ offshore subsidiaries,” “cracking down on
the abuse of tax havens by individuals,” and “devoting new resources for IRS
enforcement to help close the international tax gap.”150
The proposal also calls for
[m]easures [that] would let the IRS know how much income Americans
are generating in overseas accounts by requiring overseas banks to
provide 1099s for their American clients, just like Americans have to do
for their bank accounts here in this country. If financial institutions won't
cooperate with us, we will assume that they are sheltering money in tax
havens, and act accordingly.151
While President Obama’s proposals are mainly aimed at protecting the tax base of
the United States, they also have the effect of the United States cracking down on
foreign countries’ tax havens in order to enforce its tax code. Noncompliance would
seem hypocritical due to the recent efforts of the United States on tax evasion
abroad.
B. Benefits of Full Compliance and Non-Compliance
While much has been said about the problems with both full compliance and
noncompliance, both potential solutions do have their benefits. The benefits of
complying with Mexico’s request are straightforward. If the United States shares the
interest information that Mexico is seeking, this disclosure will help the United
States lose some of its “tax haven” status with the rest of the world. Whether the
IRS and Congress like it or not, the United States offers de facto banking secrecy to
all nonresident aliens that place their money in U.S. banks. The United States fails to
provide other foreign countries with the necessary information so that those foreign
countries can tax or not tax the bank interest as they see fit. Complying with
Mexico’s request is the first step in the process of stopping this practice. Another
benefit of fully complying with Mexico’s request is keeping the relationship between
the United States and Mexico productive and friendly. Given the proximity and the
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amount of importing and exporting done between the two countries, it is in the best
interest of the United States to keep its relationship with Mexico intact.
There would also be several advantages to the United States in not complying
with Mexico. Failing to comply with Mexico’s request would on the surface cost the
country nothing. Banks would not have to expend any additional resources to
comply with potential legislation. The bureaucracy would also not have to expend
time and resources in an additional project to develop and oversee. Failing to
comply would also be financially beneficial to the banking sector. If Florida would
stand to lose $4.4 billion to $8.36 billion each year from potential legislation, how
much would the rest of the nation lose as well? The entire sum lost due to investors
moving their funds elsewhere would hurt the industry as a whole. Another benefit to
the United States in not complying with Mexico is that it would set positive
precedent for other countries wanting to make the same request. While the United
States was willing to compromise with Canada, noncompliance would show that
Canada truly was the exception to the rule.
C. Where the UBS Agreement Fits In
Due to the significant concerns with full compliance and noncompliance, the
United States must be more creative and flexible with its solution to Mexico’s
request. However, a lot of groundwork may have already been done in connection
with the UBS Agreement. The United States and Mexico already have a basic
framework to use. In November of 2009, the IRS disclosed the criteria used in
determining which UBS accounts would be turned over to the United States and the
IRS.152 If an American client had an account with UBS that contained more than
$248,200 in it, then that account information was provided to the IRS.153 Accounts
that received more than $99,280 each year in annual revenue also had account
information turned over to the IRS.154 The annex to the UBS Agreement additionally
required the disclosure of most undisclosed bank accounts that had assets exceeding
approximately $990,000 at any time between 2001 and 2008.155 The annex also
called for disclosures when a U.S. person, regardless of domicile, "beneficially
owned 'offshore company accounts'" in use at any time between 2001 and 2008 if
there is suspicion of "tax fraud or the like."156 In a separate measure, the IRS initiated
a voluntary disclosure program that allowed account holders with UBS and all other
foreign financial institutions around the world to voluntarily come forward and admit
that they were evading taxation.157 If the taxpayer voluntarily disclosed their account
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information before an investigation had already been started by the IRS, the taxpayer
would still have to pay hefty fines, penalties, and back taxes, but jail time would
most likely be avoided.158
Even though only approximately 4,450 accounts will be handed over by
Switzerland in the near future under the UBS Agreement, the voluntary disclosure
program had great success. While typically only 100 offshore account holders
voluntarily disclose their account information through similar programs each year,
more than 14,700 taxpayers with bank accounts in seventy countries voluntarily
disclosed their account information by the program’s October 15, 2009 deadline.159
IRS Commissioner Douglas Shulman was quoted as saying, “We are talking about
billions of dollars coming into the U.S. Treasury.”160 The UBS Agreement also
allowed both countries to get what each wanted. The United States and the Treasury
were able to increase its tax revenue immediately, while Switzerland was still able to
keep most of its banking secrecy intact.161 This compromise appears to be a good
model for a potential compromise between the United States and Mexico in the near
future.
Once again, however, this compromise is not as beneficial to both countries as
may be anticipated. While this basic framework is a good start for the United States
and Mexico, there are still some major issues that would need to be worked out. The
criteria used to determine which accounts would be handed over to the IRS by UBS
and the Swiss government should have never been released. While these criteria
would not control in any potential resolution between the United States and Mexico,
it would probably be the starting ground for the criteria used to determine which
accounts would be handed over to the Mexican government by the United States.
Now that the Swiss criteria particulars have been made public, wealthy Mexican
residents with bank accounts in the United States have a general basis to determine
how to structure their bank accounts going forward. Because of this criteria
disclosure, a different formula will need to be used to determine which accounts
would be handed over to the Mexican government. This leads to another problem
with the UBS Agreement. After the dust settles from the UBS Agreement, U.S.
account holders in Swiss banks with funds that exceed $248,200 or annual revenues
that exceed $99,280 will move their funds elsewhere in fear of a similar request
being made by the United States in the future. Even if Switzerland will no longer
assist its banks’ customers in evading taxes, some other country will. Mexico would
run into the same problem of its residents moving their funds elsewhere if a
resolution is reached with the United States.
The criteria used for the UBS Agreement also limited the number of potential
accounts turned over to approximately 4,450 when the IRS initially sought
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information from approximately 52,000 accounts held by U.S. residents in UBS
financial institutions.162 Criteria that limits the account information turnover rate to
less than 10% of the number of potential tax evaders (4,450 / 52,000) is only a
temporary solution to the problem. According to Senator Carl Levin of Michigan,
“the tortured wording and the many limitations in [the compromise] shows the Swiss
Government trying to preserve as much bank secrecy as it can for the future, while
pushing to conceal the names of tens of thousands of suspected U.S. tax cheats.”163 I
imagine a compromise similar to the UBS Agreement would be equally
disappointing for the Mexican government as they would be settling for whatever the
United States would be willing to relinquish.
A perfect solution allows the Mexican government to increase its tax revenue,
while not negatively affecting the U.S. banking sector. However, this perfect
solution is probably not possible. The remainder of this Note will attempt to craft a
solution that is beneficial to both the United States and Mexico.
V. THE ANSWER TO A UNITED STATES-MEXICO COMPROMISE
It is in the best interest of the United States to take positive steps towards
complying with Mexico’s request to some extent. Given the extensive history
between the two countries, the United States does not appear to have much choice.
Ignore Mexico, and a dysfunctional relationship is sure to follow. However, the
United States may not be able to avoid the strong opposition of its banking sector.
Like it or not, the U.S. banking sector will have a strong influence on how the United
States compromises with Mexico in the near future.
The first element that needs to be considered in crafting a viable solution is
immediacy. The solution to this problem needs to have immediate effects for
Mexico.
Despite some minor setbacks caused by Switzerland’s Federal
Administrative Court, the UBS Agreement was quite effective on this element. As
mentioned earlier, over 14,700 taxpayers with bank accounts in 70 countries
voluntarily disclosed their accounts during 2009 through the IRS’s voluntary
disclosure program.164 The number of voluntary disclosures through voluntary
disclosure programs for noncompliant taxpayers was up significantly from the usual
100 taxpayers who disclose their foreign account information through the program
on a yearly basis.165 In conjunction with the additional billions of dollars that should
be brought in as tax revenue, the IRS has now also been made aware of “a wide
range of tax evaders and evasion methods”166 due to these voluntary disclosures.
"The program reached out to lots of different taxpayers with lots of different
circumstances all around the globe,"167 IRS Commissioner Douglas Shulman said.
An increase in voluntary disclosures through a voluntary disclosure program and the
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awareness of tax evaders and their methods of tax evasion is extremely beneficial in
Mexico’s continued effort against drugs and tax evasion.
The United States was also able to negotiate an accelerated time frame for
requests to be honored by the Swiss government. Within sixty days of UBS receiving
a request from the Swiss Federal Tax Administration (SFTA), UBS submitted the
necessary account information to the SFTA on the first 500 cases submitted by the
United States. The remaining cases will be submitted by UBS to the SFTA within
270 days of the initial request by the United States. While the January 2010 Swiss
ruling has slowed down the accelerated time frame, this process is an effective
manner to structure a compromise between the United States and Mexico around. A
similar exchange of information mechanism, together with an initiative started by the
Mexican government for voluntary disclosures through voluntary disclosure
programs and any additional information obtained from the voluntary disclosures of
the tax evaders themselves, are a sufficient starting ground for Mexico and its
crackdown on drugs and tax evasion.
The second element that needs to be considered is the long-term effects of the
potential compromise. While the UBS Agreement was a good short-term solution to
the problem, minimal safeguards were put in place to deter future tax evasion by
U.S. taxpayers in the future. According to the United States Department of Justice,
“UBS has . . . agreed to expeditiously exit the business of providing banking services
to United States clients with undeclared accounts.”168 While this is a victory for the
United States, the long-term effects of the UBS Agreement end there.
Under Article I of the Agreement between the United States and the Swiss
Confederation, the approximate number of accounts expected to fall under the
United States’s request is 4,450.169 Even if, for argument’s sake, this was believed to
be sufficient account information being turned over to the United States, what about
the rest of the estimated 52,000 accounts where account information is not being
handed over? If UBS account holders were willing to take a risk by not voluntarily
disclosing their account information and, on top of that, do not have their account
information turned over to the U.S. government at all, the remaining thousands of
undisclosed accounts appear to walk away clear of any harm for the time being.
Also, there are thousands of other financial institutions all over the world. The
account holders in these banks, who are evading taxes as well, do not suffer any
consequences for their blatant tax evasion. While the threat of 4,450 account holders
having their account information being handed over to the United States may have
scared some into voluntarily disclosing their account information, those accounts
make up only a small fraction of the bank account holders evading taxes on the
national, or even global, level. More needs to be done in a compromise between the
United States and Mexico to turn this one time request by Mexico into a regular
exchange of information between the two neighboring countries. Until then, tax
evasion will always be an ongoing issue between the United States and Mexico.
While the United States and Mexico cannot end tax evasion entirely by themselves, a
sound compromise between the two countries could go a long way in developing
other similar compromises between countries all over the world.
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On this front, one step that the United States has taken in the past is allowing the
U.S. Treasury to take action against financial institutions or jurisdictions that pose
tax evasion concerns, including preventing U.S. financial institutions from doing
business with the offending bank or jurisdiction and essentially locking the offending
bank or jurisdiction out of the U.S. financial system.170 Similar action needs to be
taken with any potential compromise with Mexico. Governments across the world
need to band together against rogue banks that refuse to cooperate with the tax laws
of the countries they are operating in.
Another possible long-term solution to Mexico’s crackdown on tax evasion
would be to amend the United State’s tax treaty with Mexico. The U.S. and OECD
Model Treaties do not allow either country involved to go “phishing” for information
held by the other country.171 The language in both model treaties requires a country
to know who or what it is looking for in advance when requesting information.172
This language obviously presents some problems. Amending this process, allowing
for an automatic exchange of interest and bank account information, would be a
more beneficial way of monitoring and preventing tax evasion on a long-term basis.
Specific names would not be needed by the requesting governments, and information
could automatically flow between the two countries based on criteria established
during negotiations. A good example of this practice is the agreement already in
place between the United States and Canada.173
The third element that needs to be considered in developing a solution to
Mexico’s request is the potential effect on the United States and Mexico in terms of
trade. As mentioned before, the United States, Mexico, and Canada have an
important trade agreement in place that affects approximately $17 trillion in goods
and services among the three countries.174 Given the importance of this agreement, it
would be in the best interest of the United States to reach an amicable agreement
with Mexico, if only to protect the trade relationship of the United States with
Mexico. The United States was able to negotiate with Switzerland to surrender
similar information to the United States simply because of the importance of the
United States to Switzerland and its economy. Switzerland had nothing else to gain
from surrendering bank account information to the United States. If anything,
Switzerland stands to lose significant tax revenue by divulging this information
because clients are moving their funds outside of the country. The United States
must be willing to do the same for Mexico, if only to protect itself and its trade
relations.
VI. CONCLUSION
In light of the UBS Agreement, it is in the best interest of the United States to
comply with Mexico's request for information in a similar fashion. In the end, all
countries involved will only have the interests of their citizens in mind when
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negotiating a compromise. While it would be great if the entire world came together
and unite as one to put an end to tax havens altogether, that is just not possible due to
the amount of money involved. Mexico would benefit the most if the United States
were to fully comply. This would give the Mexican government the information
necessary to find and tax those who are evading taxes, especially those involved with
drug cartels. However, full compliance would hurt the U.S. financial sector, as
foreign investors would be likely to move their funds elsewhere. The United States
would benefit the most if it were to ignore Mexico’s request completely. United
States banks and financial institutions would not have to fear investments and
revenue leaving its system. The United States government would not have to expend
the resources to initiate a new system of reporting this information to the IRS, and
eventually, Mexico. However, non-compliance would be a last resort for the United
States as it would have an extremely negative impact on its relationship with
Mexico.
Therefore, the United States and Mexico need to reach a compromise that will
benefit both countries. The United States will have to budge and give up some
interest information through an exchange of information agreement, similar to the
one reached between the United States and Switzerland. At the same time, Mexico
cannot expect full compliance. There is no benefit for the United States in doing
such. Like the United States did with Switzerland, Mexico needs to request full
compliance but be content with whatever the United States is willing to share.
However, there must be more of a long-term impact on the prevention of tax evasion
between the United States and Mexico. A one-time exchange of information may be
financially beneficial to both the United States and Mexico, but it does not solve the
problem of tax evasion. Permanent automatic exchange of information is just one of
the steps the United States needs to take if it hopes to continue its efforts on the
worldwide fight against tax evasion.
In the end, the only benefits the United States may receive from any sort of
compromise with Mexico is the concept of not disrupting its trade relationship with
Mexico and starting the process of removing its “tax haven” status with the world.
However, removing its “tax haven” status may not be as important as the negative
financial implications that would occur in the end. It remains to be seen what the
U.S. Treasury and Congress will do, but it is safe to say that full-compliance and
non-compliance are not viable options for the United States going forward.

